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ABSTRACT 
This paper draws on James Ferguson’s concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of illusio to explore the nature of the international development 
cooperation programmes financed by the Czech government. It argues that its character as an 
‘anti-politics machine’ turns development into a highly technical issue and dismisses 
essential political questions of global equity and policy coherence from the public debate. 
Moreover, the actors in the field of development cooperation are held in an illusio: they are 
required to appear as altruistic, which obscures their particular interests. This 
instrumentalization of development aid contributes to further isolation of the Czech 
development constituency and raises fundamental questions for the democratic legitimacy of 
development cooperation. 
Keywords: Development cooperation, depoliticization, legitimacy, anti-politics machine, 
illusio, Czech Republic 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article s’appuie sur les notions de « machine anti-politique » de James Ferguson et 
d’illusio de Pierre Bourdieu afin de révéler la nature de la coopération au développement 
financée par la République tchèque. L’article avance que son caractère de « machine anti-
politique » transforme le développement en un sujet technique et évacue les problèmes 
politiques essentiels de justice globale et de cohérence de politiques du débat publique. 
D’autre part, les acteurs dans le champ de la coopération du développement sont pris dans un 
illusio : étant censés apparaître comme altruistes, le soupçon sur leurs intérêts particuliers est 
écarté. Cette instrumentalisation de l’aide au développement contribue à une plus profonde 
isolation de la communauté des développeurs tchèques et pose des questions fondamentales 
sur la légitimité démocratique de la coopération du développement. 
Mots clés: Coopération du développement, dépolitisation, légitimité, machine anti-politique, 
illusio, République tchèque 
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RESUMEN 
Este artículo se apoya en la noción de “maquina anti-política” de James Ferguson y en el de 
illusio de Pierre Bourdieu con el fin de descubrir la naturaleza de la cooperación al desarrollo 
de la República checa. El artículo argumenta que el carácter de “maquina anti-política” de 
aquélla transforma el desarrollo en un sujeto técnico y excluye del debate público los 
problemas políticos esenciales relacionados con la justicia global y con la coherencia de 
políticas. Por otro lado, los actores en el campo de la cooperación al desarrollo son presa de 
una ilusión: se les pide que aparezcan como altruistas, de tal manera que esconden sus 
intereses particulares. Esta instrumentalización de la ayuda al desarrollo contribuye a un 
mayor aislamiento de la comunidad de practicantes del desarrollo y plantea algunas 
cuestiones fundamentales sobre la legitimidad de la cooperación al desarrollo de la 
República Checa. 
Palabras claves: cooperación al desarrollo, depolitización, legitimidad, máquina anti-
política, illusio, República Checa 
 
JEL Classification: P33, P45 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Development cooperation is not a new issue area of Czech foreign policy. The fact 
that Czechoslovakia was not part of the Western bloc during the Cold War does not 
mean, however, that it was immune to the post-World War II development discourse. 
If the antagonist discourses of Marxism-Leninism and democratic liberalism opposed 
one another, both had in common their faith in economic growth, technical progress 
and industrialization. Both competing camps also shared their political and 
commercial interests in Africa, Asia and Latin America, so that the practices of 
Western and Eastern development experts in the Third World were much more 
similar than the opposing ideologies might suggest. But when in 1990 the communist 
discourse in the East lost its legitimacy and the corresponding regime based on 
political violence and the military presence of the Soviet Union lost its power over 
the Czechoslovak citizens, the country cut all development aid, on which it was 
spending up to 1% of its gross national income (GNI) (Halaxa and Lebeda, 1998). 
By the time of the Czech-Slovak split in 1993, the nations were immersed in the 
domestic political, economic and social transition, and assistance to the South was 
reduced to contributions to international organizations, humanitarian aid and 
scholarships for students from the South. 
Changes of political regimes often bring a mirror-like reaction from the society. The 
discredited communist discourse included ‘friendship’ with the developing countries 
‘on the road to socialism’. It was replaced by Western liberal discourse with almost 
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the same emphasis. The majority of the Czech population lost confidence in income 
redistribution and state interventions in the economy, the principles on which 
development cooperation has been at least partly grounded. It was only during a later 
stage of transition that the Czech Republic entered the ‘the club of the rich’, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), engaged with 
the Bretton Woods institutions and associated with the European Union (EU). The 
country has officially aligned to liberal global development discourse and it accepted 
– as a part of the accession package – international commitments to deliver 
development aid again. 
The Czech government has accordingly created institutions and allocated budget for 
development projects in the South, but internal political will and public awareness on 
global issues have remained low. Moreover, as private donorship is weak, many non-
governmental development organizations (NGDOs) are heavily dependent on 
government funding and they do not represent grassroots initiatives, organizations 
and movements. In the Czech society, aid-giving is almost seen as the unique way of 
contributing to the development of the South, and within the tiny aid debate, quantity 
and not quality of aid is seen as the most important challenge. Even so, the Czech 
proportion of the volume of official development aid hardly surpasses 0.1 % of the 
world total (see OECD, 2009). Statistics suggest that Czech aid is negligible from a 
global perspective, but the annual volume of official development aid spent by the 
Czech Republic still represents some 150 million euros, i.e., 0.14 % of the Czech 
GNI. This sum is important from the domestic perspective and it keeps alive a vivid 
development constituency – the body of actors that implement, formulate or 
participate in the formulation of Czech development cooperation. 
At first sight, the Czechs seem to have taken on board the underlying values and 
culture of the contemporary global discourse on poverty reduction in the South. The 
liberal type of discourse based on the Millennium Development Goals prevails not 
only in the political space and in media, but also in civil society, and even in 
academia. The critics of Czech development cooperation agree that its direction is 
good despite that efforts are inadequate since the government does not spend enough 
money on development cooperation. Many external actors that questioned the 
effectiveness of Czech aid have been satisfied by the recent institutional 
centralization of policy-making at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the creation of 
a development agency in 2009. However, they do not pay attention to the 
uninterrupted practices that promote particular interests of the Czech development 
actors. This consensus in the perception of development aid is surprising. Above all, 
the Czech development discourse is taken for a true representation of the practices on 
the ground as if the declarations on helping the poor etc. were more important than 
the actual results of development cooperation. There is little evidence about the 
impact of Czech aid as evaluations are missing or unpublished, but the message of 
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the self-confident slogan ‘The Czech Republic helps’, which makes part of the logo 
of the Czech Development Agency, seems to be shared by the whole constituency. 
The missing deliberation of the Czech society on development cooperation and 
development as such raises more general and fundamental questions about the 
democratic legitimacy of the development constituency. In order to refine the 
diagnosis and analyze its causes, this paper starts by presenting a theoretical 
framework inspired by the Foucauldian concept of ‘depoliticization’. It argues that 
James Ferguson’s (1997) concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ is also relevant to the 
development apparatus of a medium-sized re-emerging donor in the North. Secondly, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘illusio’ helps to define development cooperation as a 
field in which actors have an interest in presenting themselves as altruistic, and 
consequently, suspicion of development actors’ egoistic interests is evaded 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 1994). The final part of this paper briefly 
analyzes the consequent relative isolation of the development constituency from the 
rest of the society and gives directions for further research. Finally, the paper draws 
consequences from the lack of democratic legitimacy in Czech development 
cooperation. 
 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AS AN ‘ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE’ 
 
The current Czech development discourse is characterized by the frequent 
identification between what the members of the Czech development constituency do 
and say in the name of development. It has to be resolved by an ‘epistemological 
break’ (Bachelard, 1970), in other words noting the risk of “replacing reality for pre-
constructed objects existing within and through everyday language.” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 37). This principle concerns not only the oral expression of the actors, but 
particularly the ‘documentary reality’ created by their institutions (Smith, 1974). 
Ontologically, development and development cooperation are not notions that would 
immediately correspond to the reality, but they have their own history and they 
entertain a complex relation with the practices. Discourses participate in the creation 
of social reality and allow or prohibit social practices (e.g. development aid). This 
direction is not, however, the only one possible: social practices retrospectively 
influence the discourses that legitimize the practices (e.g. the division between 
developed and developing countries). I build, therefore, on the later work of Michel 
Foucault (1975, 1976), initially applied in the area of development by Arturo 
Escobar (1995) and Gilbert Rist (2001) at macro level. However, as a study of a 
specific development constituency, the book The Anti-politics Machine: 
‘Development,’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho by James 
Ferguson (1997) represents the most valuable input. In contrast to his predecessors, 
Ferguson puts more emphasis on practices, but at the same time, he does neither 
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disconnect them from international development discourse nor does he reduce 
development cooperation to practices alone, as does the anthropologist Jean-Pierre 
Olivier de Sardan (1995).  
Concerning the example of a rural development project implemented by the world 
Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (ACDI/CIDA) in Thaba-
Tseka region from 1975 to 1984, Ferguson has shown that “the causes of poverty in 
Lesotho are political and structural (not technical and geographical), that the national 
government is part of the problem (not a neutral instrument for its solution)” 
(Ferguson, 1997, p. 69). The World Bank has excluded from its technical analysis the 
political structures of Basotho society, labour migration into surrounding South 
Africa and the seemingly irrational surplus of cattle, related to cultural tradition and 
gender relations. The costly project funded by the World Bank and CIDA, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, was intended to increase livestock 
production, introduce new crops and improve local infrastructure. However, it met 
resistance from the local population and it did not lead to poverty reduction, but 
instead it only strengthened the power of the central government over the political 
opposition in Thaba-Tseka. That is why Ferguson labelled the project in Lesotho an 
“anti-politics machine”: 
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by 
promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed 
people, the hegemonic problematic of ‘development’ is the principal means 
through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today. At 
the same time, by making the intentional blueprints for ‘development’ so highly 
visible, a ‘development’ project can end up performing extremely sensitive 
political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional 
state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to 
which no one can object. (Ferguson, 1997, p. 256). 
Ferguson’s analysis is inspired by Foucault’s (1975) critique of prison: like the 
World Bank’s apparatus in Lesotho, the prison does not help to reintegrate criminals, 
but rather, it seems to lead to recidivism. Despite its meagre success, the prison 
transforms the political problem of legitimacy and illegitimacy into the seemingly 
technical problem of delinquency, and adds the institutions of re-education and 
control. Analogically, the Thaba-Tseka project has transformed the political problem 
of poverty, related to the South African apartheid labour market, into a technical 
problem, but eventually it resulted in the stronger control of the Basotho population 
by its authoritarian government. 
The concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ has a background in political philosophy, but 
it has not otherwise found application outside the anthropology of development, and 
infrequently, development theory (see De Vries, 2007). It has inspired research on 
environmental resource management in Malaysia (Brosius, 1999) and urban 
agriculture in Cameroon (Page, 2002), and more generally, development 
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interventions in pre-genocide Rwanda (Uvin, 1998). Paul Nadasdy (2005) has 
described the depoliticization of development intervention in the North, but still from 
the perspective of an internal colonization, in the case of a wildlife management 
project in an aboriginal area of Yukon. Only recently has the concept of 
depoliticization gained the attention of scholars in relation to the rise of 
“governance” (Hout and Robinson, 2009). But the anti-political machine is not 
limited to the field of development projects in the South and North. I argue that the 
Czech development constituency shares the Fergusonian character of ‘anti-politics 
machine’. Development cooperation, which was primarily based on the need to 
honour international commitments, was reduced to a technical concern for aid 
volume and institutional settings; it displaces the issues of global governance and 
policy coherence with other government policies. 
Some objections have been raised against Ferguson’s concept. In relation to Czech 
development cooperation, it is important to emphasize that, according to Ferguson, 
the development apparatus does not necessarily mean “bureaucratic state power”, but 
it can also encompass “bureaucratic power” tout court (Ferguson, 1997, p. 273), and 
even “bureaucratic non-state power” as Foucauldian “governmentality” is not 
necessarily exclusively performed by the state (Williams, 2004, p. 564). It is hence 
relevant also to the NGDOs that make part of the development constituency. 
Moreover, Glynn Williams contests the claim that the outcome of a development 
intervention is always necessarily depoliticizing. While I agree that depoliticization 
will be the most frequent outcome of a development intervention, the strategies of 
the local actors are not predicable and they can lead to their greater political 
involvement as well. These possible unpredicted outcomes are discussed in the last 
part of the paper in relation to the paradoxical role of the EU in Czech development 
policy. 
 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AS A SEEMINGLY DISINTERESTED FIELD 
 
In order to comprehend the Czech development constituency, the Foucauldian 
framework alone is insufficient. There is indeed a blind spot regarding the 
motivations of the actors. In his analysis of the World Bank’s project in Lesotho, 
Ferguson asks how the donor uses a misplaced technical and geographic jargon in the 
identification of development needs instead of dealing with economic and political 
issues, and what the projects do in the field. However, he does not consider why the 
international organization does so and he deliberately leaves this question to further 
research. He does not pay attention to the motivations and strategies of the 
‘developers’. I consider the scrutiny of the interests of the Czech development actors 
as a meaningful and complementary objective. Indeed
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external discourse for defending their particular actual interests, unacceptable in a 
given field, which may remain hidden even for themselves.  
The ‘developers’ are not necessarily determined by the dominant discourse to accept 
the values which make part of the discourse. Quite the opposite, the ‘culture of 
development cooperation’ may be used by them as a ‘tool kit’ from which they 
choose elements for their strategies and instrumentalize it for their particular needs 
(Swidler, 1986). Taking the declared altruistic motivations of the actors for the real 
interests would mean to yield to the illusion of the game, on which development aid 
is grounded. As Pierre Bourdieu claims, ‘generally, but especially in some universes 
such a the scientific field (champ), it is more advantageous to appear as disinterested, 
benevolent and altruistic, than as egoist. (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 166). The field of 
development cooperation represents without doubts a social field in which the actors 
succumb to the illusio in both economic and psychological aspects.1 
According to Bourdieu, researchers are not aware enough of their “scholastic point of 
view“, and this is why they spread methodological individualism outside the 
economic field as a consequence of the missing reflection of their own methods. In 
fact they put the scholar in the machine (savant dans la machine), they project their 
conscious decisions, which constitute part of their own reflection on the behaviour of 
the actors, and they forget that their own actions are influenced by the scientific 
habitus. At the same time, Bourdieu warns against the opposite perspective of 
researchers bluntly accepting the perception of the actors as those may be, for 
example, superstitions and prejudices (Bourdieu, 1982). The Bourdelian articulation 
of the problem agency-structure, does not, hence, prohibit the questioning of the 
behaviour of individual actors, and completes the Foucauldian framework. 
Bourdieu has been criticized for his use of illusio, as overestimating the scientist’s 
ability to uncover the rules of the game in a specified field, and at the same time, 
downgrading the anticipation of the agent for the rare occasions of crisis (Costay, 
2005). This bias would be due to his ideal-typical approach, limiting the complexity 
and coexistence of different logics of action within a given field. The economic 
interest, or economic calculus as understood by the Chicago school, remains limited 
particularly to the economic field (Boyer, 2003). But that would be to forget that 
many subfields lay in between major fields like the political and economic field. The 
field of development cooperation is not free of economic interest. The NGDOs are 
dependent on the government and they have to write budget proposals or respond to 
tenders. 
                                                 
1
 Illusio is the “magical relation to the game that is a result of the relation of ontological complicity 
between mental structures and the objective structures of social space” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 151), or as 
Paul Costey (2005, p. 14) put it, the compatibility between the mental schemes of habitus and the 
properties of a social field (champ). 
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Consequently, development assistance (and humanitarian aid particularly) can be 
seen as the explanation taboo (tabou de l’explication) in the economy of symbolic 
exchanges and of the gift especially (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 181). For example, the 
uneasy “laugh of bishops”, elicited when the problem of funding the church is 
mentioned by the sociologist, uncovers that both economic and religious logics are 
present in the church, but the introduction of the financial perspective ‘kills’ the 
religious talk that excludes material concerns (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 204). The 
explanations that break the taboos and deconstruct the symbolic values by the mere 
fact of analysis are a difficult case for the scientist, especially if they are shared by 
the majority of the society. Similiarly, the actors involved in the field of development 
cooperation are held to be rather altruistic, as they are ‘helping the poor’, even 
though they are situated in a field which is not empty of the economic calculus. The 
explanation taboo in humanitarian and development cooperation deflects the 
suspicion of society at large from the importance of economic and political concerns 
shared by the development constituency. The latter are held by this gambit and they 
may be unaware of the entirety of the situation as well.2 The silence over the 
particular interests of the actors and their dependence upon the state strengthens the 
self-enforcing ‘anti-politics machine’ of Czech development cooperation.  
 
THE RELATIVE ISOLATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONSTITUENCY: AN 
OUTLINE 
 
As both theoretical contributions suggest, not only does the Czech development 
constituency depoliticize development aid, at the same time it makes use of it to fulfil 
its foreign policy, security and commercial interests. The purpose of this part of the 
paper is not to analyze these interests in detail, but to present some evidence as a 
base for further empirical research. Overall, it appears that the ‘liberty’ of the 
constituency is connected to the lack of public control over policy: one strengthens 
the other in a cumulative causation. The non-state sector appreciates this situation as 
far as it allows it to implement projects in the South – which may of course 
contribute to poverty reduction, but only in the short term as the ‘anti-politics 
machine’ does not require public support that would increase the importance of 
global development on the domestic political agenda. In addition to this, the NGDOs 
are kept in an ‘explication taboo’, they are not necessarily aware of their bias and the 
public assumes them to be altruistic as well. Due to low private donorship, civil 
society in post-communist countries is highly dependent on public finance and it 
seldom plays the role of a watchdog. For example, the Czech NGDO platform has 
                                                 
2
 More precisely, “le fait d’être investi, pris dans le jeu et par le jeu”, in the original version (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992, p. 64). 
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repeatedly toned down policy recommendations to the government in drafts of its 
own reports. 
As a consequence, NGDOs almost exclusively call on the government to increase the 
development budget at the expense of honouring qualitative commitments, and this 
contributes further to the depoliticization of development cooperation. On the other 
hand, the government frequently publicizes the projects of the NGDOs in the South, 
which are more focused on poverty reduction than is the case for the government-
funded projects that are implemented by the private sector. The latter often play the 
role of indirect export subsidies and their development impacts could hardly be 
appealing to the general public. In any case, with the uncritical acceptance of 
international development discourse by the Czech Republic, the political issues of 
social change in the developing world are transformed into a problem that can be 
solved by technical instruments.  
Other cross-cutting issues such as gender, environment or cultural dialogue are 
largely absent as well. Perhaps most importantly, policy coherence for development 
has not been addressed so far. Along with improved coordination of Czech aid with 
other donors and strengthening responsibility towards the partner countries, policy 
coherence is indeed the most important challenge the North faces in terms of 
development policy (Grimm et al., 2008). Indeed, slight changes in agricultural or 
trade policy, for example, may affect poverty more significantly than a substantial 
change in development cooperation. The narrow understanding of development and 
ignorance of the incoherence of policies cannot be overcome without the 
involvement in the development constituency of new actors from the public sector. 
The existing inter-ministerial Council for Foreign Development Cooperation has a 
mandate for this task and it offers an ideal initial forum for dealing with coherence 
and cross-cutting issues, but its activity has been limited to aid (Horký, 2010).  
But the impetus for broadening the development constituency will hardly come from 
inside that constituency, which naturally tends to reproduce discourses and practices. 
The increasing instrumentalization of development aid for foreign policy objectives 
that arose after the centralization of decisions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2008 and the focus on security did not lead to any reaction from civil society. It must 
be acknowledged, however, that under the Czech Presidency of the Council of the 
EU in the first half of 2009, Czech NGDOs and their platforms promoted new global 
issues, especially pertaining to the structural causes of the global financial and 
economic crisis. Very often, their activities were supported from outside by the 
European Commission and other member states. Paradoxically, this positive trend of 
repoliticization has somehow diverted attention from domestic issues. This outline 
gives only an incomplete picture of the Czech development constituency and its 
relation with Czech society. Further research should focus especially on the exact 
role of the NGDOs that are closer to the government than to grassroots organizations 
and private donors, and hence disconnected from the civil society at large. 
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CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND REPOLITICIZATION OF 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
The case of Czech development cooperation points out the general ambivalence 
toward social change in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic after 1989 when, for 
a while, the future development of the Czech society became a subject of lively 
political and public debates, before succumbing to the dominant ‘return to the West’ 
and ‘return to Europe’ narrative. But Europe and the West have changed meanwhile. 
The Czech development constituency tries to respond to two challenges at the same 
time: to catch up with the experienced donor countries and possibly to react to new 
global developments afterwards. The objective of development policy is hence 
unstable, ever-changing and seemingly receding, but the country still relies on a 
linear vision of history and tries to elevate on the East-West slope (Melegh, 2006), 
where the ‘Westness’ corresponds to the ideal of liberal democracy and high 
economic development while the remaining customs and cultural differences from 
Western Europe are seen as an expression of a lower, backward ‘Eastness’.  
The postcolonial analysis of the ‘Eastern’ enlargement of the European Union has 
also offered a unique insight in the working of these mechanisms (Böröcz and 
Kovácz, 2001). During the process of EU accession, candidate countries had to 
accept the body of EU law, the acquis communautaire, without reservation. 
Otherwise, they would be denied membership and they would not be perceived as 
truly ‘European’. The direction of their development was defined ex ante and the 
public discussion concerned the ways to ‘catch up with Europe’ rather than the goal 
itself. In consequence, the experience of political and economic transition, which 
could have brought alternative vision to development based on the specificity of the 
socialist experience, has still not undergone sufficient social reflection. How would it 
then be possible to deviate from the linear East-West slope and repoliticize 
development cooperation? 
This paper criticizes Czech development cooperation, but to be clear, it does not 
deny its role. As James Ferguson put it: “Would we say that the vivisection of a frog 
constitutes a critique? Or that it aims to ”refute” the frog’s organs?” (Ferguson, 1997, 
p. xiv-xvi). Abandoning bilateral cooperation is not an alternative. Even if 
multilateral aid was more effective, outsourcing development to Brussels, Geneva, 
New York or Washington would eventually disconnect Czech society from the 
practices of development in the South and the consequent reduction in public 
awareness and would collapse the democratic legitimacy of Czech aid deliberation. 
The opening of the development constituency within a broader political space would 
result in making development a commonly debated issue within the political parties 
and civil society, not one discussed exclusively among experts and directly involved 
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NGDOs. This proposition is paradoxical since repoliticization is not entirely 
attainable through technical means. Nevertheless, it can be attained by redirecting a 
part of the developing budget from export subsidies, covered as development aid, to 
provision of development education and awareness for the general public, politicians, 
media, and civil society at large. Paradoxically, it is the funding from the European 
Union to non-state actors, a regional body that is often seen as less political than its 
member states, that allows putting these issues slowly on the political agenda. 
Any public support of ‘disinterested’ activities hides serious contradictions, but the 
state can support even those who criticize it. Whether this support will lead to 
politicization or depoliticization is never defined ex ante. At the same time, there is a 
risk of replacing the ‘anti-politics machine’ by an ‘anti-foreign policy’ (Chandler, 
2007), a narcissist policy, which would eventually overlook the ultimate recipients of 
development cooperation, i.e. poor women, men and children. This pertains not only 
to the Czech Republic, but to other donors as well. With the Paris Declaration, donor 
governments have started – at least in their discourse – to focus on partnership, 
ownership and responsibility to the citizens of partner countries. But at the same 
time, some seem to have forgotten to consider these values in respect to their own 
citizens. Development cooperation that is not democratically rooted in both the North 
and South is unsustainable. Development aid which is – as in the Czech case – a 
product of an imposed altruism and a side-effect of Westernization and 
Europeanization, cannot be effective in the long term. For a country which self-
identifies as developed, it would only serve as a placebo. 
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